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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 43564-2015

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR PERMIT NO. 3 6-16979 IN THE NAME OF
NORTH SNAKE GROUND WATER DISTRICT, ET AL.

NORTHSNAKEGROUNDWATERDISTRICT,M AGICVALLEYGROUNDWATER
DISTRICT, and SOUTHWEST IRRIGATION DISTRICT.
Petitioners / Respondents,

v.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, and GARY SPACKMAN,
in his capacity as Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources
Respondents / Respondents,

v.
RAN GEN, INC.,
Intervenor/ Appellant.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This case presents for judicial review a decision by a district court acting in its
appellate capacity, which vacated findings by the Idaho Department of Water Resources
(the "Department" or "IDWR") and remanded an application for a water permit filed by
the North Snake Ground Water District, Magic Valley Ground Water District, and
Southwest Irrigation District (collectively the "Districts").

2. Procedural History
On April 3, 2013, the Districts filed Application for Permit no. 36-16976 (the
"Application") seeking a water right to divert up to 12 cfs from springs and/or Billingsley
Creek for mitigation and fish propagation purposes. 1 Rangen, Inc. ("Rangen") filed a
protest opposing the Application. 2
A hearing on the Application was held September 17, 2014, at the IDWR Southern
Region office in Twin Falls, Idaho, before IDWR Program Manager James Cefalo as the
hearing officer. 3
The hearing officer entered a Preliminary Order Issuing Permit (the "Preliminary
Order") and the Director of IDWR issued a Permit to Appropriate Water Right No. 3 6-

16976 on November 18, 2014. 4
Agency R., Vol. I, p. 1.
Agency R., Vol. I, p. 44. Blind Canyon Aquaranch, Inc. ("Blind Canyon") also filed a protest. Agency R.
Vol. I, p. 56.
3 Tr., p. 7, LL. 1-25. Blind Canyon did not participate in the hearing and, therefore, waived its right to offer
evidence into the administrative record and cross-examine witnesses. Tr., p. 8, LL. 11-16; Agency R. Vol.
II, p. 263.
4 Agency R., Vol. II, p. 263.
1

2
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On December 2, 2015, Rang en filed Exceptions to Preliminary Order to the Director
IDWR (the "Director"), asking him to reverse the hearing officer's decision and deny
the water right permit issued to the Districts. 5 Both Rangen and the Districts submitted
briefing to the Director concerning Rangen' s exceptions. 6

The Director issued a Final Order Denying ~4.pplication (the "Final Order") on
February 6, 2015. 7 The Final Order ruled that the Application was complete and
otherwise qualified for issuance of a permit, but was filed in bad faith and was not in the
public interest. 8 On March 5, 2015, the Districts filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the
Final Order to the district court, the Honorable Eric J. Wildman presiding (the "District
Court"). 9
On August 7, 2015, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order
(the "District Court Order") vacating the Director's findings regarding bad faith and the
public interest, and remanding the Final Order to the Director for further proceedings as
necessary. 10
Rangen filed Rangen Inc. 's Notice ofAppeal on September 15, 2015, appealing the
District Court Order to this Court. 11

5 Agency

R., Vol. II, p. 283.

6

Agency R., Vol. II, pp. 286, 313.

7

Agency R., Vol. II, pp. 349, 365.

8 Agency

R., Vol. II, p. 362, 364.

9 Agency

R., Vol. II, p. 369.

10

Clerk's R., Vol. I, pp.187, 203.

11

Clerk's R., Vol I, p. 205.
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3. Statement of Facts
North Snake Ground Water District and Magic Valley Ground \Vater District are
quasi-governmental entities formed under Chapter 52, Title 42, Idaho Code, to
represent the common interests of their members, all of whom own groundwater rights
that divert from the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer (ESPA). 12 Southwest Irrigation District is
similar, but was formed as an irrigation district under Title 43, Idaho Code.13
The Districts' primary objective is to protect their members' groundwater rights
from curtailment in response to water calls filed by holders of water rights with older
("senior") priority dates. They do this by developing and implementing mitigation plans
approved by the Department.
The Districts, along with several other ground water districts, are members of
Idaho Ground Water Appropriators, Inc. ("IGWA"), through which they carry out most of
their mitigation activities. 14
The Districts and IGWA have recently formed various mitigation plans to deliver
mitigation water to Rangen' s fish hatchery near Hagerman, Idaho. These obligations
stem from a water call filed by Rangen alleging that the use of water from the ESPA by
groundwater users had diminished the amount of water flowing from the Martin-Curren
Tunnel (commonly referred to as the "Curren Tunnel"), which supplies water to

12

See Idaho Code§ 42-5201 et seq.

13

See Idaho Code § 43-101 et seq.

IGWA members irrigate over one million acres of agricultural land, and its members include municipal
water suppliers that provide water to over 100,000 businesses and households. See Ex. 1, pp. 49-102
(listed water rights curtailed after Rangen's 2003 delivery call).
14
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Rangen' s fish hatchery near Hagerman, Idaho. 15 The Director issued a curtailment order
on January 19, 2015 (the "Curtailment Order"), ordering many of the Districts'
members to either shut off their wells or provide mitigation water to Ran gen. 16
Rangen's hatchery is located adjacent to Billingsley Creek. It consists of a green
house, hatch house, small raceways, and two sets of large raceways. 17 The Curren Tunnel
supplies water to all these fish-rearing facilities. 18
For many years, Rangen has also diverted water from Billingsley Creek through
what is known as the "Bridge Diversion." 19 This diversion supplies water to the large
raceways only. 20
The water rights serving the Rangen hatchery list only the Curren Tunnel as the
source of water; they do not list Billingsley Creek. 21
When Rangen initiated its delivery call in 2011, it filed a motion for summary
judgment arguing that its water rights include the right to divert water from all springs
forming the headwaters of Billingsley Creek, even though Rangen' s water rights list only
the Curren Tunnel as the source of water and do not include a point of diversion from
Billingsley Creek. 22 The Director, and subsequently the SRBA District Court, found that
the Partial Decrees, as entered by the SRBA District Court in December 199 7, are limited
15

Ex. 1008, pp. 1, 42.

16

Ex. 1008, pp. 42, 49-102.

Agency R., Vol. I, p. 106; Agency R., Vol. II, p. 3 50.
See Agency R., Vol. I, pp. 102, 106.
19 See Agency R., Vol. I, p. 102; Agency R., Vol. II, p. 3 5 0.
20 See Agency R., Vol. I, p. 94.
21 Agency R., Vol. II, p. 350; see also Tr., p. 181, LL. 23-25.
17

18

22

Ex. 1008 at 6-7.
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to water coming from the Curren Tunnel. 23 They ruled that the plain language of the

Partial Decrees does not permit Rangen to divert water from Billingsley Creek via the
Bridge Diversion. 24
\Vhen the Districts discovered that Rangen did not have a water right from
Billingsley Creek, they filed the Application to use Billingsley Creek water for mitigation
purposes "in the event the Director finds Rangen to be materially injured and orders
junior groundwater users to provide mitigation [to Rangen] or be curtailed." 25 The
Application has proven very valuable, as the Department subsequently issued a
curtailment order that threatens to permanently shut off many of the Districts' members'
water rights unless they provide mitigation to Rangen. 26
The Application identifies two diversions: "Hydraulic pump(s) (size TBD); screwoperated headgate on Billingsley Creek." 27 The pumps-or "Pump System"-will be used
to pump water from Billingsley Creek to the hatch house, green house, and small
raceways, which can then flow by gravity to the large raceways. 28 Thus, the Pump System
will be capable of delivering mitigation water to all of Rangen' s fish rearing facilities.

Exs.1065, 1067; Ex. 1008, p. 32-33;Memorandum Decision and Order, Twin Falls County Case No. CV2014-1338, pp.10-19 (Oct. 24, 2014).
23

Ex. 1008, p. 32-33; Memorandum Decision and Order, Twin Falls County Case No. CV-2014-13 38, pp.
10-19 (Oct. 24, 2014).

24

25

Agency R., Vol. I, pp. 1, 2.

26

Ex. 1008, p. 42.

27

Agency R., Vol. I, p. 83.

28

See Agency R., Vol. I, p. 102; see also Agency R., Vol I, p. 105-106.
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The screw-operated headgate will be a gravity-fed diversion from Billingsley
Creek. 29 The Districts will either condemn an easement to use the existing Bridge
Diversion or install a new diversion adjacent to the Bridge Diversion. 30 This headgate
will be used to deliver mitigation water to the large raceways only. 31
The Application allows up to 12 cfs to be diverted from either diversion. 32 The
Pump System is presently designed to divert up to 4 cfs, leaving the remaining 8 cfs to be
diverted by the headgate, but the Pump System could be upsized to divert the full 12 cfs
if needed. 33
At the hearing on the Application, Lynn Carlquist, chairman of North Snake
Ground Water District, explained the Districts could utilize the Application in one of two
ways:
Well, we would try to work with Rangen. Our intent would be that we could
provide now mitigation water to them for the [curtailment] order that's in
place. We could do it one of two ways: We could do a mitigation plan where
we would develop these and supply the water, or we could just-- if they
would agree, I think we could just assign the permit to them for our
mitigation. 34
This is why the Application lists two beneficial uses: fish propagation and
mitigation. Perfecting the fish propagation beneficial use would require the rearing of
fish in Rangen' s raceways, necessitating an agreement with Rangen to use its raceways
or an assignment of the permit to Rangen. By contrast, the Districts can perfect the
29

See Agency R., Vol. II, p. 3 50.

30

See Tr., p. 44, L. 19 -p. 45, L. 1.

31

See Agency R., Vol. I, p.105.

32

Agency R., Vol. I, p. 83.

33

See Agency R., Vol. I, p. 106.

34

Tr., p. 44, L.19-p. 45, L.1.
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mitigation beneficial use on their own by utilizing their own diversion structures and
delivering water to Rangen as mitigation, at which point Rangen will take control of the
water and make use of it in its raceways.
From the outset, the Districts understood that if Rangen declined to accept an

assignment of the permit the Districts vvould need to develop it on their ovvn, ·v1hich is
why the initial Application states: "The Ground Water Districts, if unable to secure
Rangen' s consent, will use their power of eminent domain as set forth in Idaho Code
section 42-5224(13) to secure necessary easements for mitigation facilities." 35
As it turned out, Rangen declined to cooperate, and on August 25, 2014, the
Districts served Rang en with a Notice of Intent to Exercise Eminent Domain and Summary

of Rights of Property Ownership. 36 The Districts have since filed an action to exercise their
power of eminent domain. 37
The hearing officer approved the mitigation beneficial use component of the
Application, but denied the fish propagation beneficial use since Rangen had not agreed
to cooperate in developing that use. 38
In response to Rangen's Exceptions to Preliminary Order, the Director denied the
mitigation beneficial use as well. 39 Despite the Districts' plan to utilize a pump, headgate,
pipes, and related facilities to divert and deliver mitigation water to Rangen, the Director
concluded that the Application does not contemplate completion of a "project," and was
35

Agency R., Vol. II, p. 2.

36

AgencyR., Vol. II, p. 355.

37

North Snake Ground Water District et. al. v. Rangen, Inc., Gooding County case no. CV-2015-123.

38

AgencyR., Vol. II,pp. 269-74.

39

Agency R., Vol. II, p. 364.
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therefore filed in bad faith. 40 He also concluded that the Application was not in the public
interest because it seeks to appropriate water that Rangen has been using for many years,
albeit without a water right to do so. 41
The Districts appealed the Director's decision to the District Court, and the District
Court ruled in their favor, vacating the Director's finding that the Application \AJas filed in
bad faith. 42 The District Court concluded that this finding was not supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole because both the Pump System and the
Bridge Diversion constituted project works under the Department's rules governing
applications for water right permits (the "Appropriation Rules"). 43 It also vacated the
Director's finding that the Application was filed in bad faith because the Director relied
on factors and considerations that were irrelevant to the local public interest. 44 The
District Court remanded the Final Order for further proceedings as necessary. 45
Rangen' s petition for judicial review challenges the District Court Order. 46 It asks
this Court to affirm the Director's Final Order denying the Districts' water right. 47

40

Agency R., Vol. II, p. 362.

41

Agency R., Vol. II, p. 3 64.

42

Agency R., Vol. II,p. 364.

Agency R., Vol. II,p. 369; Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 192. The Appropriation Rules are located in IDAPA
37.03.08.

43

44

Clerk's R., Vol. I, pp. 192-93.

45

Ckerk's R., Vol. I, pp. 6, 9.

46

Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 205.

47

See Clerk's R., Vol. I, pp. 206-08.
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4. Standard of Review
The Final Order is subject to review under the Idaho Administrative Procedure
Act. 48 "On appeal from a district court's review of agency action, this Court reviews the
district court's decision to determine whether the issues were correctly decided." 49
"Although the p::irties may have raised many issues during the administrative
proceedings, this Court will only consider those issues raised before the district court. " 50
The Final Order must be affirmed unless the Court determines the findings,
inferences, conclusions, or decisions of the Final Order are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or,
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 51
Issues of fact must be confined to the record created before the agency, 52 and a
reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of
the evidence on issues of fact. 53 However, agency findings of fact must be "supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole," not just portions of the record in
isolation. 54

48

Idaho Code§ 42-1701A(4).

A&Birrigation v. Spackman (In reA&BirrigationDist.), 155 Idaho 640,648,315 P.3d 828,836 (2013).
50 Id.

49

51

Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3).

52

Idaho Code§ 67-5277.

53

Idaho Code§ 67-5279(1).

54 Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3)(d);seealsoBarron v. Idaho Dep'tofWater Resources, 135 Idaho 414,417, 18
P.3d 219,222 (2001).
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By contrast, courts exercise free review of questions oflaw. 55 Also, "[u]nless a
mixed question of fact and law is primarily factual, [the Court] review[s] mixed questions

de novo." 56
Discretionary decisions should be affirmed if the agency ''perceived the issue in
question as discretionary, acted within the outer limits of its discretion and consistently
with the legal standards applicable to the available choices, and reached its own decision
through an exercise of reason." 57 A discretionary decision is improper if it is "arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable." 58 A decision is arbitrary "if it was done in disregard of the
facts and circumstances presented or without adequate determining principles." 59 It is
capricious if" done without a rational basis." 60 Thus, discretionary decisions must be
rational, reasonable, consistent with applicable legal standards, and based on facts in the
record and adequate determining principles.

If the Final Order is not affirmed, it must be set aside in whole or in part, and
remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 61 It should not be set aside unless
substantial rights have been prejudiced. 62

Vickers v. Lowe, 150 Idaho 439,442,247 P.3d 666, 669 (2011).
56 Thornockv. Boise Indep. Sch. Dist., 115 Idaho 466,470, 767 P.2d 1241, 1245 (1988) (quoting Gregory K.
v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also Highlands, Inc. v. Hosac, 130 Idaho 67,
69,936 P.2d 1309, 1311 (1997) ("Because mixed questions of fact and law are primarily questions oflaw,
we review them de novo.").
57 Haw v. Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 143 Idaho 51, 54, 13 7 P.3d 438, 441 (2006).
58 LaneRanchP'shipv. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 91,175 P.3d 776,780 (2007).
59 A&B Irrigation, 153 Idaho at 511,284 P.3d at 236.
60 Id.
55

61

Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3).

62

Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First, the District Court properly vacated the Director's finding of bad faith.
Director imposed a requirement of new construction that is contrary to the Idaho
Constitution. Moreover, even if this were a valid requirement the Director ignored

separate project works.
Second, the District Court did not err by recognizing the Application was not
speculative. Rangen argues this was inappropriate on the basis it constitutes a factual
finding the District Court is not permitted to make, but the Court was simply recognizing
the undisputed fact that the Districts' were facing a mitigation obligation to Rangen at
the time the Application was filed.
Third, the District Court did not err by recognizing that the Districts have the power
of eminent domain, that there is no evidence that the Application requires other permits,
and that there is no evidence of obvious impediments to the completion of the water
right permit issued under the Application. Rangen contends these were inappropriate
factual determinations; however, the District Court merely recognized the Districts'
statutory authority along with clear and obvious facts that Rangen does not dispute.
Fourth, the District Court properly determined that the Director exceeded his
authority by going beyond the statutory definition of "local public interest." Rangen
claims the Director has wide discretion to consider any factor he believes bears on the
local public interest, but the District Court properly held that the Legislature confined
the Director's discretion when it amended Idaho Code§ 42-202(B)(3) in 2003 to
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narrowly define "local public interest" to be "the interests that the people in the area
directly affected by a proposed water use have in the effects of such use on the public
water resource."
Fifth, the District Court properly affirmed the Director's determination that
mitigation is a viable beneficial use.
Sixth, the District Court properly concluded that the Director did not abuse his
discretion by accepting the signature of the Districts' attorney on the Application,
without requiring the submission of a separate power of attorney document. Rangen
claims the Director erred in this regard, even though Rangen admits that the attorney did
in fact represent the Districts and was authorized to sign the Application on their behalf.
The Director did not abuse his discretion in this regard. Moreover, the signing of the
Application by the Districts' attorney does not prejudice Rangen' s substantial rights.
For these reasons, the District Court properly vacated the Director's Final Order
and remanded it to the Director for further proceedings as necessary.
ARGUMENT
1. The District Court properly set aside the Director's finding of bad faith.

An application for a water right permit should be denied under Idaho Code§ 42203A(5) if it "is not made in good faith." Appropriation Rule 45.01.c elaborates on this
by providing that an application is made in good faith if (1) "[t]he applicant shall have
legal access to the property necessary to construct and operate the proposed project, [or]
has the authority to exercise eminent domain authority to obtain such access; (2) "[t]he
applicant is in the process of obtaining other permits needed to construct and operate the
Districts' Response Brief
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project; and (3) "[t]here are no obvious impediments that prevent the successful
completion of the project." 63
The Director ruled that the Districts' Application "fails the bad faith test based on
the threshold question of whether there will be a project, and whether there will be any
construction of works for perfection of beneficial use. " 64 In other words, he interpreted
Adjudication Rule 45.01.c to require construction of infrastructure, then found that the
Application did not propose new construction, and denied it on that basis.
The District Court set aside the Director's ruling concerning Rule 45.01.c, finding
that it is "contrary to law," "leads to absurd results," and "is not supported by the
record." 65
Rangen asks this Court to reverse the District Court decision, arguing that Rule
45.01.c.iii should require "the creation of construction of some apparatus to divert
water." 66 Rangen also contends the District Court "improperly made determinations on
issues upon which the Director did not make any finding," referring to the Court's
acknowledgement of the Districts' statutory right of eminent domain and the lack of any
evidence in the record that the Districts need other permits. 67
As explained below, the District Court's rulings on these matters are sound and
should not be reversed.

63

ID APA 3 7 .03.08.045.01.c.

64

Agency R., Vol. II, p. 362.

65

Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 193-94.

66

Rangen Inc. 's Opening Br. at 14.

67

Id.at17.
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1.1 The District Court properly set aside the Director's requirement of new
construction because it is contrary to law and leads to absurd results.
Rangen asks this Court to accept the Director's ruling that Rule 45.01.c.iii requires
"the creation of construction of some apparatus to divert water." 68 The District Court
properly set aside this interpretation because is contrary to law and leads to absurd
results. 69 Further, even if it were a valid requirement, the Director's finding that the
Application does not propose construction of a project is not supported by the record.

A. The District Court properly found that the Director's requirement of
new construction is contrary to law.
When a reviewing court considers an agency interpretation of a rule, it applies a
four-pronged test to determine whether deference to an agency interpretation is
appropriate. 70 These factors, as stated in Duncan v. State Board ofAccountancy, are
"whether: (1) the agency is responsible for administration of the rule in issue; (2) the
agency's construction is reasonable; (3) the language of the rule does not expressly treat
the matter at issue; and (4) any of the rationales underlying the rule of agency deference
are present." 71 No deference is afforded to an agency interpretation that fails any of
these four prongs. 72 This Court has held that an agency interpretation is unreasonable if

Id. at 14.
69 Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 194.
68

70

Duncan v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 149 Idaho 1, 3,232 P.3d 322,324 (2010).

71

Id.

See J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849,862,820 P.2d 1206, 1219 (1991)
(applying the four prongs of deference to an agency interpretation of a statute); see also Farber v. Idaho State
Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307,314,208 P.3d 289,296 (2009) (giving no deference where the second and third
factors were not met); Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 611 n.2, 200 P.3d 1153, 1160 (2009)
(explaining that an agency construction "must be reasonable").
72
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"the agency relied on erroneous facts or law in its determination." 73 Such findings are
generally arbitrary and capricious. 74
The District Court found the Director's requirement of new construction to be
contrary to law, explaining:
The Director's interpretation of the good faith requirement as
necessitating construction in order to perfect a water right is contrary to
law. The perfection of a water right requires the diversion and application
of water to beneficial use. See e.g., U.S. v. Pioneer Irr. Dist., 144 Idaho 106,
110,157 P .3d 600,604 (2007). If such diversion and application to
beneficial use can be accomplished using pre-existing diversion works,
there is simply no further requirement that new or additional diversion
works be constructed. As long as water can be diverted and put to
beneficial use, the question of whether it will be diverted and applied via
the use of pre-existing diversion works, or diversion works to be newly
constructed is inconsequential. Interpreting IDAPA 3 7.03.08.045.01.c. to
contain a new construction or project requirement in order to perfect a
water right is contrary to Idaho water law, and conflicts with the
constitutional guarantee that "[t]he right to divert and appropriate the
unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses, shall never
be denied." Idaho Const., Art. XV § 3. 75
Rangen does not dispute this analysis, but nonetheless argues that the Director's
requirement of new construction is "entitled to deference." 76 Rangen's position ignores
the standard of review. Whether Rule 45.01 requires new construction is a question of
law over which courts exercise "free review. " 77

73
74

Duncan, 149 Idaho at 3, 232 P.3d at 324.
See Staffordv. IdahoDep'tofHealth & Welfare (In re Stafford), 145 Idaho 530,539, 181 P.3d 456,465 .

(2008) (W. Jones, J. dissenting) (arguing that an agency acted in a manner that was arbitrary and capricious
when it erroneously interpreted its regulations).
75

Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 194.

76

Rangen Inc. 's Opening Br. at 14.
Vickers, 150 Idaho at 442,247 P.3d at 669.

77
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The District Court provided a sound explanation of why the Director's
interpretation of Rule 45.01.c is contrary to law. This decision should not be reversed.

B. The District Court properly found that the Director's requirement of
new construction leads to absurd results.
The District Court additionally concluded that the Director's interpretation of Rule
45.01.c.iii "leads to absurd results," 78 noting that "[t]here are many instances in which a
prospective water user is able to divert water and apply it to a beneficial use using preexisting project works." 79 To illustrate, the Court explained:
A new homeowner purchases a piece of property serviced by a preexisting
well and irrigation system. The homeowner subsequently learns that his
predecessors never applied for or received a water right authorizing the use
of water from the well. Further, that a water right is necessary given the
lot's size. Therefore, the homeowner submits an application for permit to
appropriate water via the existing well and irrigation system. Under the
Director's interpretation, the application will be found to have been filed in
bad faith since it does not propose the development of any new project
works. This is an absurd result. There is simply no legal prohibition
impeding the homeowner from using the existing well and irrigation
system to divert water and apply it to beneficial use, thereby perfecting the
water right.
The absurd nature of the Director's reasoning is further apparent when considering
Rangen's own application for a water right from Billingsley Creek. Rangen filed its
application after the Districts had filed theirs (making Rangen' s water right junior to the
Districts' right). 80 Rangen' s application proposed to use existing infrastructure without
any new construction. Consequently, Rangen' s application must be denied under the

Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 194 (citing Jasso v. Camas County, 151Idaho 790,798,264 P.3d 897,905 (2011)
(explaining that" [c]onstructions that lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored").

78

79

Clerk's R., Vol. I, p.194.

so Rangen Inc. 's Opening Br. at 16.
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Director's interpretation of Rule 45.01.c. Yet, the Director went ahead and approved
Rangen' s application without requiring new construction, demonstrating the arbitrary
and capricious nature of the Director's denial of the Districts' Application. 81
Rangen does not challenge the District Court's conclusion that the Director's
requirement of ne,v construction leads to absurd results. Therefore, this Court should
uphold the District Court's decision to set aside the Director's interpretation of
Appropriation Rule 45.01.c to require of new construction.

C. The Director's finding that the Application does not propose a
project is not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a
whole.
Even if the Director's requirement of a project were correct, the District Court
correctly found that the Director's finding that the Application does not propose a project
"is not supported by the record." 82
Rangen contends "there is substantial and competent evidence to support the
Director's finding that there are threshold impediments to completion of a project,"
arguing that "[t]he GWD's do not intend to build diversion works or divert the water." 83
This assertion blatantly ignores, as did the Director, undisputed evidence in the record
that the Application does in fact propose project works.

A decision is arbitrary "if it was done ... without adequate determining principles." A &B Irrigation, 15 3
Idaho at 511, 284 P.3d at 236. It is capricious if "done without a rational basis." Id.

81

82

Clerk's R., Vol. I, p.193.

83

Rangen Inc. 's Opening Br. at 11.
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Under the Appropriation Rules, project works include "diversion works ... which
may be used to apply the water to the intended use." 84 As the District Court correctly
recognized, "[t]he Districts' application proposes to divert water from two separate
points of diversions via two separate project works." 85 The first is a Pump System that
will be constructed to pump water from Billingsley Creek into a pipe that will connect to
Rangen' s existing pipe, which conveys water to the hatch house, green house, and small
raceways. 86 The District Court properly acknowledged: "It is undisputed that the first
diversion contemplates the construction of project works." 87
The second diversion "is proposed to be diverted through an existing diversion
work ... known as the Bridge Diversion." 88 As with the first diversion, the District Court
correctly concluded that the Bridge Diversion constitutes project works since it is a
diversion works that applies water to the intended use. 89
Since uncontroverted facts show the Application proposes two distinct diversion
works, which both constitute project works under the Appropriation Rules, the District
Court properly concluded that the Director's finding that Application proposed no
project was not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 90

84

Clerk's R., Vol. I, p.194 at 8 (citingIDAPA 37.03.08.010.14).

85 Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 193. IDAPA 37.03.08.010.14 defines project works as "[a] general term which
includes diversion works, conveyance works, and any devices which may be used to apply the water to the
intended use."

See Agency R., Vol. I, p. 102.
87 Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 193.
88 Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 194

86

89

Clerk's R., Vol. I, p.194 (citingIDAPA 37.03.08.010.14).

°Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 193.
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1.2 The District Court did not err by acknowledging the Districts' statutory
power of eminent domain.
Appropriation Rule 45.01.c.i explains that for an application to be made in good
faith" [t]he applicant shall have legal access to the property necessary to construct and
operate the proposed project, [or] the authority to exercise eminent domain authority to
obtain such access." 91
The District Court acknowledged the Districts' have authority to obtain access by
eminent domain, noting that "Idaho Code§ 42-5224(13) grants [the Districts] 'the
power of eminent domain in the manner provided by law for the condemnation of
private property for easements, rights-of-way, and other rights of access to property
necessary to the exercise of the mitigation powers herein granted .... "' 92 These powers
expressly include the powers to "appropriate, develop, store, and transport water within
the state," 93 and to "develop, maintain, operate and implement mitigation plans
designed to mitigate any material injury caused by ground water use within the district
upon senior water uses within and/ or without the district. " 94
Rangen contends the District Court erred, arguing that Idaho Code§ 42-5224(13)
does not give the Districts authority to obtain fee title to Ran gen' s property, and that the
Districts cannot develop their mitigation water right without fee title to Rangen' s
property. 95 Rangen cites Idaho Code § 7-702 for the proposition that fee title is required,

91

IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.c.i.

Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 195.
Idaho Code§ 42-5224(8).
94 Idaho Code§ 42-5224(11).
95 Rangen Inc. 's Opening Br. at 20.
92

93
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but that statute only requires fee title for "public buildings or grounds, or for permanent
buildings, for reservoirs and dams and permanent flooding occasioned thereby, or for an
outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit of debris or tailings of a mine." By contrast, the
statute provides that an easement is adequate "for any other use." 96
As explained above in the statement of facts, the Application requires the use of
pumps and pipes, neither of which require fee simple under Idaho Code § 7-70 2.
Consequently, the Districts' authority to condemn "easements, rights-of-way, and other
rights of access" is sufficient. A review of decisions by this Court demonstrate that an
easement is sufficient to construct or condemn a wide range of infrastructure such as
sewers, 97 power lines, 98 roads, 99 ditches, 100 canals, 101 and-especially relevant herediversion works, pumping plants, transformer stations, and pumping houses. 102 Indeed,
the Districts' condemnation power would be worthless if they could not use it to divert
and convey water for mitigation purposes.
Thus, the District Court did not err by acknowledging the Districts' statutory power
of eminent domain satisfies Appropriation Rule 45.01.c.i.

96

Idaho Code §7-702.

E.g., Payette Lakes Water & Sewer Dist. v. Hays, 103 Idaho 717,719,653 P.2d 438,440 (1982).
98 E.g., Sutton v. Hunziker, 75 Idaho 395,403,272 P.2d 1012, 1016 (1954).
99 E.g., Kolouch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho 65, 66,813 P.2d 876,877 (1991).
100 E.g., Aguirre v. Hamlin, 80 Idaho 176,181,327 P.2d 349,352 (1958).
101 E.g., Canyon View Irrigation v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 101 Idaho 604,608,619 P.2d 122,126 (1980).
102 E.g., Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243,244,270 P.2d 825, 825 (1954).
97
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1.3 The District Court did not err by acknowledging there is no evidence in
the record of additional permits needed by the Districts.
Appropriation Rule 45.01.c.ii explains that for an application to be made in good
faith the applicant must be "in the process of obtaining other permits needed to construct
and operate the project." 103
Rangen contends the District Court erred by acknowledging there is no evidence in
the record that the Districts need other permits. 104 However, the District Court merely
recognized an undisputed fact. The Districts put on evidence that the Districts needed no
other permits, and Rangen submitted no evidence of other permits it claims are
necessary. 105 The District Court's acknowledgement of an undisputed fact is not
improper and should not be disturbed.

2. The District Court did not err by rejecting Rangen' s argument that the
Application is speculative under Idaho Code§ 42-203A(5) (c).
A water right application can be denied under Idaho Code § 42-203A(5) (c) if it is
made for speculative purposes. 106 The Director declined to address speculation because
he concluded the Application was filed in bad faith. 107 Notwithstanding, Rangen argued
on appeal to the District Court that the Application should be denied on the basis that it

103

IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.c.ii.

104

Rangen Inc. 's Opening Br. at 22.

105 Rangen inferred at the hearing the Districts would need NPDES, CAFO, and other fish-rearing permits.
Tr., p 76, L. 16-p. 79, L.11. However, this argument is predicated on the Rangen's mistaken assumption
the Districts will take control of and operate Rangen' s hatchery. Since Rangen will continue to raise fish
with the mitigation water delivered to it by the Districts, there is no need for the Districts to obtain NPDES
or other fish-rearing permits.
106

Idaho Code§ 42-203A(5)(c).

107

Agency R., Vol. II, p. 362.
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was filed for speculative purposes. 108 The District Court rejected Rangen' s argument,
finding that the Application was not speculative. 109 Rangen now contends that the
District Court erred by addressing its argument concerning speculation.11°
Aside from the inequity of Rangen attacking a conclusion that it asked the District
Court to make; the District Court 's did not make a factual finding but rather a legal
conclusion based on clear and undisputed facts from the record. Appropriation Rule
45.01.c explains the basis for a conclusion of speculation:
[W]hether [an application] is made for ... speculative purposes requires an
analysis of the intentions of the applicant with respect to the filing and
diligent pursuit of application requirements. The judgment of another
person's intent can only be based upon the substantive actions that
encompass the proposed project. Speculation for the purpose of this rule is
an intention to obtain a permit to appropriate water without the intention
of applying the water to beneficial use with reasonable diligence. 111
This analysis first considers questions of fact-the "substantive actions" of the
application. Based on these facts, a decision is made as to whether an application is, as a
matter of law, speculative. Thus, the issue of speculation is a mixed question of fact and
law, and the District Court, especially when confronted with only the legal aspect of this
issue, exercises free review. 112
Here, the record is clear regarding the underlying facts concerning the Districts'
intention in filing the application. As the District Court noted:

108

Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 94.
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Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 202.
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Rangen Inc. 's Opening Br. at 23.
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IDAPA37 .03.08.045.01.c.
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"Unless a mixed question of fact and law is primarily factual, [the Court] review[s] mixed questions de

novo."Thornock, 115 Idaho at 470, 767 P.2d at 1245 (quoting Gregory, 811 F.2d at 1310.
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There is no evidence in the record establishing a lack of intent on behalf of
the Districts to apply the water identified in their application to beneficial
use with reasonable diligence. To the contrary, the record establishes that
at the time the application was filed, Rangen' s delivery call seeking the
curtailment of various of the Districts' members had been filed. Ex. 100 8,
p.1. By its express terms, the Districts' application was filed in response to
the pending call. R.,pp.2 & 84. By the time the Department conducted its
hearing on the application, the Director had issued his curtailment order
finding material injury to Rangen' s senior rights, resulting in a mitigation
obligation on behalf of the Districts to Rangen. Ex. 1008, p.42. These
undisputed facts corroborate the stated intent of the Districts that they will
"use this water for mitigation purposes to protect groundwater use on the
Eastern Snake Plain to mitigate for Rangen' s apparent material injury and
to provide mitigation for the curtailment of junior groundwater users as
specified in the Director's [curtailment order]." R., p.84.11 3
Rangen does not dispute the fact that the Districts legitimately need the
Application to provide mitigation and have, from the outset, intended to so use the water
for mitigation. Instead, Rangen cites to foreign cases for the proposition that an
application is speculative if the applicant does not have an agency or contract
relationship with the party appropriating the water. 114 This argument, however, is
relevant only to the fish propagation beneficial use, which the Department denied since
it requires the rearing of fish and the Districts were unable to procure an agreement
allowing them to utilize Rangen's raceways for that purpose. It is inapplicable to the
mitigation beneficial use because the Districts have the ability to appropriate water for
mitigation on their own, without a contractual relationship with Rangen.

113

Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 202-03.

Rangen Inc. 's Opening Br. at 23 (citing Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co.,
197 Colo. 413,594 P.2d 566 (1979);Bacherv. Office of the State Eng'rofNev., 122 Nev. 1110, 146 P.3d
793 (2006)).
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Rangen also argues that the Application is speculative because it "designates a
[place of use] and a [point of diversion] wholly located on Rangen' s property. 115 It quotes

Lemmon v. Hardy, which states that "a water right initiated by trespass is void" and that
"[1] ack of a possessory interest in the property designated as the place of use is
speculation. " 116

Lemmon is easily distinguishable. There, the applicants sought to appropriate water
for fish propagation on land that would be "leased from the Idaho Power Company
and/or Magic Springs," but they had not yet obtained a possessory interest in this
proposed place of use, nor they did not have the power of eminent domain to acquire this
place of use. 117 The Lemmon decision explicitly acknowledges a possessory interest is not
necessary if it can be acquired through condemnation, as held in Marshall v. Niagara

Springs Orchard Co., 22 Idaho 144, 125 P. 208 (1912), andBassettv. Swenson, 51 Idaho
256, 5 P.2d 722 (1931).11 8
As explained above, the Districts have statutory authority to condemn easements
for mitigation purposes to deliver water to the place of use specified in their Application.
Thus, the only issue before the District Court was the legal determination of
whether-in light of the undisputed fact that the Districts legitimately need the
Application to provide mitigation to Rangen, and that they filed the Application for this

Rangen Inc. 's Opening Br. at 24.
116 Id. (quoting Lemmon v. Hardy, 95 Idaho 778, 780, 781, 519 P.2d 1168, 1170, 1171 (1974) (quoting
Bassettv. Swenson, 51 Idaho 256,259, 5 P.2d 722, 723 (1931)).
117 Id. at 778,519 P.2d at 1168.
118 Id. at 780,519 P.2d at 1170.
115
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specific purpose-the Application was speculative. The District Court did not err in
concluding that it was not.
Lastly, even if the Director decided questions of fact in concluding the Application
is not speculative, doing so was not improper. Under Idaho law, "[w]hen the record on
appeal does not yield an obvious answer to the relevant factual question, the appellate
court may not properly make those findings of fact." 119 However, when the record is
clear and yields "an obvious answer to the factual question," an appellate court can
supply this clear and obvious finding on appeal. 120 As explained above, there is no dispute
that the intent of the application is to supply mitigation water to Rangen.
The District Court did not err by acknowledging clear and obvious facts in the
record and concluding that the Application is not speculative. Therefore, its decision on
this point should not be disturbed.

3. The District Court properly concluded the Director exceeded his authority
when he ruled that the Application was not in the local public interest.
An application for a water right permit can be denied under Idaho Code§ 42-

203A(5) "if it will conflict with the local public interest as defined in section 42-202B."
The Director denied the Application on the basis that it conflicts with the local
public interest. The District Court set aside this decision because it strays well beyond
the definition in section 42-202B, and, therefore, exceeded the Director's authority.
Rangen asks this Court to reverse the District Court and defer to the Director's analysis,

119

Sherryv. Sherry, 111 Idaho 185,186, 722 P.2d 494,495 (Ct.App.1986).

See id.;seealsoPerryPlumbingCo. v. Schuler, 96 Idaho 494,497,531 P.2d 584,587 (1975) (explaining
that when the record is clear; "[t]he absence of findings may be disregarded by the appellate court").
120
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even though Rangen does not dispute that the Director went outside the bounds set by
section 42-202B. 121
The Director gave three rationaies for finding that the Application is not in the local
public interest: the appropriation 1) is not fair, 2) adds no new water to Billingsley Creek,
::mil ~)

Pm ploy-:

an in::ippropri::itP 11sP of PrninPnt ilom::iin. ThP ni<:trict ro11rt propPrly

explained that all three rationales exceed the Director's authority.

3.1 The District Court properly concluded the Director cannot deny the
Application based on his perception of fairness.
In addressing the local public interest, the Director first attacked the fairness of the
Application, arguing that it (a) "could be characterized as a preemptive strike against
Rangen to establish a prospective priority date earlier than any later prospective date
borne by a Rangen application," (b) "attempts to ... divert[] water to Rangen that Rangen
has been using for fifty years," and (c) "would establish an unacceptable precedent in
other delivery call proceedings." 122
The District Court properly conclude that these fairness rationales exceed the
Directors authority under Idaho Code§ 42-202B(3), 123 which defines the "local public
interest" as "the interests that the people in the area directly affected by the proposed
water use have in the effects of such use on the public water resources. "124 The District Court
recognized "the [Idaho] Legislature intended the definition of 'local public interest' to be

121

Rangen Inc. 's Opening Br. at 25.

122

Agency R., Vol. II, p. 364.

123

Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 197.

124

Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 197 (quoting Idaho Code§ 42-202B(3) (emphasis added by District Court).
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narrowly defined and construed" through a 2003 amendment. 125 Before this
amendment, the local public interest was "broadly defined ... as 'the affairs of the
people in the area directly affected by the proposed use,"' 126 but the 2003 amendment
"narrowed the definition of the local public interest considerably." 127
RPcognizing the narrow liPfinition oflocal p11hlic interPst; thf' District (;ourt

properly concluded that the Director's fairness rationales exceed statutory authority. 128
First, the Court found that the Director's determination that it was unfair that the
Districts applied for the unappropriated water before Rangen "is contrary to law"
because it "penalize[s] the Districts for being first in time," in conflict with the longstanding principle of appropriation that "first in time is first in right." 129
Second, regarding the Director's consideration of Rang en's prior use of Billingsley
Creek without a water right the District Court stated: "The fact that Rangen has allegedly
used the subject water historically is irrelevant, except to show that there is
unappropriated water available to appropriate." 130
Third, regarding the Director's concern for an alleged unfair precedent, the District
Court noted that "[t]he Director does not explain how such a precedent would negatively

125

Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 197.

126

Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 197 (quoting 1978 Idaho Sess. Laws 306).
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Chisholm v. State Dep't of Water Res. (In re Transfer No. 5639), 142 Idaho 159, 164 n.3, 125 P.3d 515,

520 (2005).
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Clerk's R., Vol. I, p. 197.
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Clerk's R., Vol. I, p.198.
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or otherwise affect the interests that the people in the area directly affected by the
proposed use have in the effects of such use on the public water resource." 131
Rangen takes issues with the Director's analysis, but it ignores the 2003
amendment of the definition of local public interest, and instead quotes a 1988 case that
states: "The determination of what elements of the public interest are impacted, and
what the public interest requires, is committed to Water Resources' sound discretion." 132
Neither Rangen nor the Director can disregard current legislation that supplants prior
law and more narrowly defines and limits the local public interest to factors affecting the
public water resources.
Rangen also quotes from the Statement of Purpose for the 2003 amendment,
which states: "The determination of what elements of the public interest are impacted,
and what the public interest requires, is committee [sic] to Water Resources' sound
discretion." 133 Yet, that same Statement of Purpose also provides that the Director
should, "within the confines of this legislation, ... consider all locally important factors

affecting the public water resources. " 134 Thus, the Statement of Purpose, when read as a
whole, likewise fails to support Rangen' s position.
Because the Director's perceptions of fairness go beyond "the interests that the
people in the area directly affected by the proposed water use have in the effects of such

131

Clerk's R., Vol. I,p.198.

132 In re Application for Permit No. 47-7680, 114 Idaho 600,607, 759 P.2d 891,898 (1988) (quoting
Shokalv. Dunn, 109 Idaho 330,339,707 P.2d441, 450 (1985)).
133 Rangeninc. 's Opening Br. at 26-27 (quoting House Bill No. 284-Statement of Purpose RS 13046, which

amended Idaho Code§ 42-202B in 2003).
134

Id. at 26 (quoting House Bill No. 284 Statement of Purpose RS 13046) (emphasis added).
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use on the public water resources," the District Court properly found the Director exceeded
authority under section 42-202B(3).

3 .2 The District Court properly concluded the Director exceeded his
authority by requiring the Application to bring new water to the Curren
Tunnel and Billingsley Creek.
The Director also denied the Application on the basis that it "brings no new water
to the already diminished flows of the Curren Tunnel or headwaters of Billingsley
Creek." 135 The District Court deemed this consideration irrelevant and beyond the
Director's authority because "[a]n application to appropriate water, by its very definition,
does not bring new water to a water system-it seeks to appropriate unappropriated
water." 136 Indeed, if the Director were permitted to deny a water right application on the
basis that it does not add water to the source from which it diverts, the Director would
have unrestricted authority to deny any and all applications, even if they completely
complied with all other statutory and regulatory requirements.
The District Court further highlighted the arbitrary nature of the Director's
reasoning, noting that "[the Director] approved Rangen's competing application (though
it was filed later in to time) to appropriate the same unappropriated water from the same
source and point of diversion proposed by the Districts," yet without requiring Rangen to
add water to Billingsley Creek. 137 The District Court properly found this rationale to

exceed the Director's authority.
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3.3 The District Court properly concluded the Director exceeded his
authority in finding it inappropriate for the Districts to use their eminent
domain powers to perfect the Application.
The Director's last basis for concluding the Application is not in the local public
interest was that the Districts' proposed use of eminent domain to obtain the easements
needed to construct the project on Rangen's property, which the Director ruled "is
inconsistent with the local public interest and inappropriate. " 138 The District Court
responded:
The Legislature has expressly granted ground water districts "the power of
eminent domain in the manner provided by law for the condemnation of
private property for easements, rights-of-way, and other rights of access to
property necessary to the exercise of the mitigation power herein
granted .... " LC.§ 42-5224(13). It is an exceedance of the Director's
authority to determine when the use of such power is appropriate. 139
The District Court further noted that "the Director does not explain how this
consideration is pertinent to evaluating the effects of the Districts' application on the
public water resource." 140
In sum, the District Court properly vacated the Director's finding that the
Application is not in the local public interest because it was based on factors and
rationales that exceed the scope of the public interest inquiry defined by Idaho Code §

138

Agency R., Vol. II, p. 364.
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42-202B(3). The Districts also contend that the Director's public interest ruling is
arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 141

4. The Director and the District Court properly held that the Application
appropriately describes mitigation as a beneficial use.
Rangen argues that the Application must be denied on the basis that" [m]itigation
does not adequately describe a beneficial use." 142 This argument challenges the Director
and the District Court, both of whom concluded mitigation is a viable beneficial use. 143
The District Court explained:
Idaho's statutory and administrative rule scheme recognize the use of
water in conjunction with a mitigation plan. Idaho Code§ 42-5201(13)
defines "mitigation plan" as a "plan to prevent or compensate for material
injury to holders of senior water rights caused by the diversion and use of
water by holders of junior priority groundwater rights who are participants
in a mitigation plan." Idaho Code § 4 2-5 2 2 4 grants the board of directors
of a ground water district the power to "develop, maintain, operate and
implement mitigation plans designed to mitigate any material injury
caused by ground water use within the district upon senior water uses
within and/ or without the district." Rule 43 of the Conjunctive
Management Rules (CMR) specifically recognizes the use of water to
mitigate for injury to a senior right. IDAPA 3 7.03.11.043.01.c., 03.a., b.
and c. Indeed, the inability to beneficially use water in order to mitigate for
injury to a senior right would not only run contrary to the express language
of the CMR but would also undermine significant provisions of the CMR.
In this case, both the hearing officer and the Director found mitigation to
be a viable beneficial use. In so holding, the Department acknowledged
that it has previously recognized the beneficial use of "mitigation" in the
issuance of other water rights. R., pp.3 5 8-3 59. Likewise, the SRBA District
Court has also recognized the beneficial use of "mitigation," and has
issued numerous partial decrees that were litigated with a "mitigation"
See Idaho Code§ 67-52 79(3)(a), (e); Haw, 143 Idaho at 54,137 P.3d at 441; see alsoA&B Irrigation,
153 Idaho at 511, 284 P.3d at 236 (stating agency action "is arbitrary if it was done in disregard of the
facts and circumstances presented or without adequate determining principles").
141
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purpose of use. See e.g., Partial Decree, SRBA Subcase No. 22-13247 (June
12, 2008);PartialDecrees, SRBASubcase No. 37-22631, 37-22632, 3722633 (June 29, 2012); Partial Decree, SRBA Subcase No. 63-33511
(March 3, 2014);PartialDecree, SRBASubcase No. 37-11811 (September
24, 2010). The Districts' application identifies the rights that the
appropriation seeks to mitigate as well as the purpose of use of those rights
receiving the mitigation. R., p.2. 144
In summary, the District Court explained that Rangen's opposition to mitigation as
a viable beneficial use attempts to undermine (a) Idaho statutes and regulations enabling
mitigation plans, (b) mitigation plans and water rights accomplishing mitigation, and (c)
administrative and judicial decisions approving of mitigation. The District Court
properly affirmed the Director's determination that mitigation is a viable beneficial use.

5. The District Court properly concluded that the Director did not abuse his
discretion by accepting the signature of the Districts' attorney.
Rangen argues the Director erred by accepting the Application, arguing that it was
incomplete on the basis that "no authority has been filed for all the Applicant GWDs"
and "[iJ t is essential that agents working on behalf of their principals have express
authority to act. " 145
Rangen relies on Appropriation Rule 3 5.03.b.xii, which states applications "shall be
signed by the applicant listed on the application or evidence must be submitted to show
that the signator has authority to sign the application," 146 along with Rule 3 5.03.b.xiv,
which states applications "may be signed by a person having a current 'power of
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attorney' authorized by the applicant," in which case a "copy of the 'power of attorney'
be included with the application." 147
Rangen' s argument is misplaced. As explained below, (a) Appropriation Rule
35.03.b.xiv does not require licensed attorneys to have a written power of attorney when
acting on behalf of their clients, (b) evidence in the record shows that the Districts'
attorney was in fact authorized to sign the Application on behalf of the Districts, (c)
IDWR accepted and processed the Application, and it would be utterly unjust to reverse
that action now, and (d) even if the Application were not properly signed, this technicality
does not prejudice Rangen's substantial rights. Accordingly, the District Court correctly
concluded that the Director did not abuse his discretion by accepting the Application as
complete.

5.1 Appropriation Rule 35.03.b.xiv does not require licensed attorneys to
have a written "power of attorney" when acting on behalf of their clients.
Rangen asks IDWR to interpret Rule 3 5.03.b.xiv in a manner that goes beyond its
plain language. The Rule states applications "may be signed by a person having a current
'power of attorney."' 148 It does not mention licensed attorneys, let alone require licensed
attorneys to provide a written "power of attorney" before acting on behalf of their clients.
Rangen's argument fails to distinguish between licensed attorneys, who as a matter
of law are authorized to sign legal documents on behalf of their clients, and nonattorneys, who as a matter of law cannot act as another's agent without a written "power
of attorney" document.
147

Id. at 34 (quoting ID APA 3 7.03.08.035.03.b.xiv).

148
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The Idaho Supreme Court explained in Storey v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co. that "an attorney has authority, by virtue of his employment as such, to do in behalf

of his client all acts, in or out of court, necessary or incidental to the prosecution and
management of the suit, but has no power to compromise or release the cause of action
itself." 149 The Court later explained this is part of the implied aud1ority of licensed
attorneys:
The relationship between an attorney and client is one of agency. The
answer to whether an attorney can bind his client by a stipulation rests in
whether the subject of the stipulation falls within the scope of the
attorney's implied authority, and if it is outside the attorney's implied
authority, whether the client has actually authorized or later ratified his
actions. It is generally recognized that an attorney has " ... the general
implied or apparent authority to enter into or make such agreements or
stipulations, with respect to procedural or remedial matters, as appear, in
the progress of the cause, to be necessary or expedient for the
advancement of his client's interest or to accomplishment of the purpose
for which the attorney is employed." Yet it is well settled that " ... The
implied authority of an attorney ordinarily does not extend to the doing of
acts which will result in the surrender or giving up any substantial right of
the client. " 150
Thus, a licensed attorney can, as a matter of law, bind his client, so long as he is not
giving up his client's substantial rights. 151
In contrast, non-attorneys have no right to bind another person unless they have a
signed "power of attorney" authorizing the non-attorney to act as the person's agent.
This type of authority derives from the Uniform Power of Attorney Act, Title 15, Chapter

Storeyv. UnitedStatesFid. &Guar. Co., 32 Idaho 388,392,183 P. 990,991 (1919).
150 Muncey v. Children's Home Finding & Aid Soc'y, 84 Idaho 147, 150-51, 369 P.2d 586, 588 (1962)
(quoting 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client§ 100, p. 917).
151 See, e.g., Evans v. Power County, 50 Idaho 690, 706, 1 P.2d 614, 620 (1931) (upholding attorney
agreement on behalf of client concerning distribution of proceeds from execution of a judgment).
149
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Idaho Code, and is entirely separate from the authority of licensed attorneys acting
on behalf of their clients. 152
When Appropriation Rule 35.03.b.xiv uses the term "power of attorney," it must be
read harmoniously with both the Uniform Power of Attorney Act and Idaho law
governing attorneys, so as to require non-attorneys who sign applications on behalf of
others to submit a written "power of attorney" evidencing their authority, while allowing
licensed attorneys to sign on behalf of their clients. As the IDWR does not control the
practice oflaw, Rule 35.03.b.xiv cannot be construed as a limitation on the inherent legal
authority of licensed attorneys to act on behalf of their clients.
Moreover, the Director's acceptance of the Application without requiring an
additional Power of Attorney document falls within his purview to interpret the
Department's administrative rules and is entitled to deference. If" (1) the agency is
responsible for administration of the rule in issue; (2) the agency's construction is
reasonable; (3) the language of the rule does not expressly treat the matter at issue; and
(4) any of the rationales underlying the rule of agency deference are present," that
interpretation is entitled to deference. 153
The Director is responsible for administration of the Appropriation Rules, 154 his
interpretation of Appropriation Rule 35.03.b.xiv is reasonable, the language of the rule
does not expressly address licensed attorneys, and the Director's interpretation is
supported by the underlying rationale of agency deference that it is a practical
152

Idaho Code§ 15-12-101 et seq.

153

Duncan, 149 Idaho at 3,232 P.3d at 324.

154
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interpretation. 155 Accordingly, the District Court properly declined to set aside the
Director's interpretation of Rule 35.03.b.xiv.

5.2 Ample evidence in the record supports the Director's decision to accept
the application as complete.
\Vhen dealing with licensed attorneys, IDWR simply needs evidence "to show that
the signator has authority to sign the application," as required by Appropriation Rule
3 5.0 3. b.xii. 156 The District Court recognized this evidence:
The Districts' application and subsequent amended applications for permit
were signed by Thomas J. Budge, the Districts' attorney of record
("Budge"). R., pp.2, 15 & 84. Lynn Carlquist, as representative of the
Districts, testified that Budge has represented the Districts since 2007, that
the Districts were consulted prior to the filing of the application, and that
Budge had authority to file the application on behalf of the Districts. Tr.,
pp.26-36. The applications also contain the Districts' mailing address as
"c/o Randall C. Budge, 201 E. Center Street; P.O. Box 1391, Pocatello,
Idaho 83204." R., pp.2, 15 & 84. 157
In addition to his testimony, Mr. Carlquist provided resolutions from two of the
Districts, Magic Valley Ground Water District (MVGWD) and North Snake Ground
Water District (NSGWD), that explicitly ratify the authority of the Racine firm to file the
Application. 158 The record is void of-and Rangen failed to produce any-evidence
showing the Racine firm was not authorized to sign the Application.

155 "There are five rationales underlying the rule of deference: (1) that a practical interpretation of the rule
exists; (2) the presumption oflegislative acquiescence; (3) reliance on the agency's expertise in
interpretation of the rule; (4) the rationale of repose; and (5) the requirement of contemporaneous agency
interpretation." Id.
156
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Moreover, the Racine law firm, and Randy Budge and T.J. Budge in particular, have
a long and well-known history of representing IG\NA and the Districts in proceedings
before IDWR and the Idaho judiciary. IDWR was well aware of this at the time the
Application was submitted, since the Budges were in the midst of representing the

IDWR. 159 IDWR' s first-hand knowledge the Racine firm represents the Districts was
sufficient to accept the Application at the time it was filed.
For these reasons, the Director did not abuse his discretion in accepting that Mr.
Budge was authorized to sign the Application on behalf of the Districts.

5 .3 The District Court properly affirmed the Director's acceptance of the
Application since denying it would be unjust.
Appropriation Rule 3 5.0 l.d explains that applications for permit that are "not
complete as described in Subsection 35.03 will not be accepted for filing and will be
returned along with any fees submitted to the person submitting the application." 160
Thus, ID WR has a duty, within a reasonable time, to officially reject an incomplete
application. In contrast, applications that are complete "will be accepted for filing and
will be endorsed by the department as to the time and date received." 161
IDWR accepted the Districts' Application, processed it, advertised it, and set it for
hearing. 162 The Districts relied upon these actions. Had the Application been incomplete
due to concern over the authority of the Districts' attorneys to sign it, additional evidence
159

See, e.g., Ex. 1008 Oisting Mr. Budge as on the certificate of service in the Curtailment Order).

160
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could have easily been provided well in advance of the filing of Rangen' s Application,
which was not filed until February of 2014-ten months after the Districts filed
Application. 163 To deny the Districts their Application and priority date now, years after
the fact, would be utterly unjust.

5.4 Even ift.11.e Application were not properly signed, this technicality does
not prejudice Rangen' s substantial rights.
Even if ID\:VR technically erred by deeming the Application incomplete without
first instructing the Districts to submit a separate Power of Attorney document to verify
Mr. Budge' s authority, the omission does not prejudice Rangen' s substantial rights.
The obvious purpose of Appropriation Rule 35.03.b's signature requirements is to
ensure the applicant is indeed the party seeking the proposed permit. It is not to create a
trap for attorneys who customarily sign pleadings on their clients' behalf, and it has no
bearing on the legal standards applicable to water permit applications found in Idaho
Code§ 42-203A or the substantive legal inquiries in the Appropriation Rules.
Rangen does not dispute that Mr. Budge was in fact authorized to sign for the
Districts, and evidence was presented at the hearing confirming that, thereby curing any
technical deficiency. While Rangen may have a right to challenge the Application's
compliance with the standards set forth in Idaho Code§ 42-203A(S), it is not a member
of the Districts, has no interest in their internal affairs, and does not have standing to
challenge Mr. Budge' s authority to sign the Application on behalf of the Districts.

163
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For these reasons, the District Court properly concluded that the District did not
discretion in accepting the Application as complete.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Districts asks this Court to affirm the District Court
Order.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of February, 2016.

RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE &
BAILEY, chartered

RandaliC.Budge
Thomas J. Budge

Attorneys for IGWA
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